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Antitrust in the Early 1990's: Challenges to
New Competitive Strategies
Alan P. Sherbrooke*
The early 1990's saw the usual antitrust cases involving restric-
tions on medical staff privileges, claims of antitrust immunity
based on state action and the Local Government Antitrust Act,'
and exclusive contracts. It also produced a Supreme Court deci-
sion, Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas,2 holding that there is no inter-
state commerce defense in a staff privileges case.
The interesting antitrust cases, however, arose out of the efforts
of healthcare providers and healthcare plans to compete more vig-
orously and agressively. In general, the courts have been skeptical
of claims that the defendants actually harmed competition in a rel-
evant market, and have allowed firms that had legitimate business
justifications for their conduct to compete aggressively.
* Mr. Sherbrooke is a Principal with the Seattle, Washington office of Garvey, Schu-
bert & Barer. He received his Doctor of Jurisprudence from Harvard University, magna
cum laude, in 1978. His practice is in the areas of hospital acquisitions, medical staff
litigation, antitrust administrative litigation, and related issues. He is a member of,
among other groups, the Industry Regulation Committee, the Antitrust section of the
American Bar Association, the National Health Lawyers Association, and the Washing-
ton State Society of Hospital Attorneys.
1. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 34-36 (West Supp. 1992).
2. 111 S. Ct. 1842 (1991). In this case, Dr. Pinhas alleged that a hospital and its
medical staff (petitioners) conspired to drive him out of business "because he refused to
follow an unnecessarily costly surgical procedure." Id. at 1844. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari "to consider petitioners' contention that the complaint fails to satisfy
the jurisdictional requirements of the Sherman Act .... " Id. The petitioners argued that
"there is no factual nexus between the restraint on this one surgeon's practice and inter-
state commerce." Id. at 1847.
The Court concluded that proof of unlawful effects is not required to establish a Sher-
man Act violation. Id. at 1847-1848. In addition, the Court stated (without elaboration
or support) that the boycott would, if successful, cause a reduction in the total provision
of ophthalmological service in the Los Angeles market, and that jurisdiction could there-
fore be based on "a general conclusion that the defendants' agreement 'almost surely' had
a market-wide impact and therefore an effect on interstate commerce .... " Id. at 1847.
In a sweeping conclusion, the Court stated: "The competitive significance of respon-
dent's exclusion from the market must be measured, not just by a particularized evalua-
tion of his own practice, but rather, by a general evaluation of the impact of the restraint
on other participants and potential participants in the market from which he has been
excluded." Id. at 1848.
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I. COMPETITION BETWEEN HOSPITALS AND OUTPATIENT
FACILITIES
Tarabishi v. McAlester Regional Hospital 3 involved competition
between a hospital's outpatient surgery department and the outpa-
tient surgery center owned by Dr. Tarabishi, a physician who had
staff privileges at the hospital. The hospital opposed Dr. Tarab-
ishi's certificate of need application and initiated several investiga-
tions and reviews of his cases, culminating in the revocation of his
surgical and emergency room privileges less than two months
before his center opened. Because his privileges had been cur-
tailed, Dr. Tarabishi could not treat patients at the hospital who
had been transferred there from his center. There were no other
hospitals in the area, and Dr. Tarabishi's center eventually closed.
Dr. Tarabishi contended that the actions of the hospital and a
group of physicians (the "Clinic") constituted (a) monopolization
of surgical care by the hospital, (b) attempted monopolization of
non-surgical and office health care by the Clinic, and (c) a conspir-
acy to monopolize and to restrain trade between the hospital and
the Clinic.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's
conclusion (after a nine week trial) that the monopolization claim
against the hospital failed because the plaintiff did not prove mar-
ket power. First, the plaintiff's expert testified that the relevant
geographic market was the area within 30 miles of the hospital,
based on the fact that 84% of the hospital's patients came from
that area.4 The court rejected this as an inadequate basis for a geo-
graphic market definition because the expert "did not take into ac-
count whether patients who lived within the 30-mile radius went
elsewhere than [the hospital] for surgical health care services."5
Second, the plaintiff "simply failed to present any evidence about
the Hospital's power to control prices, a critical element of proof of
monopoly power in this circuit."6
The Tenth Circuit also affirmed the trial court's adverse ruling
on the attempted monopolization claim against the Clinic. Again,
the court ruled that the plaintiff had failed to prove a relevant mar-
ket, this time because the plaintiff's expert excluded physicians
3. 951 F.2d 1558 (10th Cir. 1991).
4. Compare Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1407 (9th Cir. 1991) ("It is
generally accepted in the health industry and uncontested in this case that hospitals
within thirty minutes traveling time of each other compete for patients.").
5. 951 F.2d at 1567.
6. Id. at 1568.
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who lived within the 30 mile radius but did not practice in the
town where the hospital was located. Furthermore, there was no
evidence of the Clinic's ability to exclude competition and to con-
trol price.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the adverse judgment on the Sher-
man section 1 claim on the ground that (1) there was no per se
violation because denial of staff privileges through peer review "is
not an activity 'likely to have predominantly anticompetitive ef-
fects' such that per se treatment is necessary"' and (2) there was no
rule of reason violation because the plaintiff failed to prove a rele-
vant market within which there was injury to competition. The
court concluded that the plaintiff had failed to "prove that Dr.
Tarabishi's inability to use the facilities at the Hospital affected
competition, as opposed to Dr. Tarabishi himself as a
competitor. '"8
7. Id. at 1571.
8. Id. The Tenth Circuit rejected the hospital's claim of antitrust immunity under
the Local Government Antitrust Act ("LGAA"), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 34-36. The court dis-
tinguished the numerous cases from other jurisdictions that have held that public hospi-
tals are protected by the LGAA. First, the court concluded that "the City of McAlester
is the beneficiary of the public trust, and as such is clearly not liable for any damage
award made against the trust. Thus, the LGAA's concern about imposing unfair burdens
on the taxpayers is not implicated." 951 F.2d at 1566. Second, Oklahoma's Tort Claims
Act (as in effect at the relevant time) differentiated between public hospitals and munici-
palities, school districts, and counties. Therefore, the court concluded, the hospital was
not entitled to immunity under the LGAA. Id. at 1566-1567.
In another recent case involving the state action doctrine or the LGAA, Todorov v. DCH
Healthcare Authority, 921 F.2d 1438 (1 1th Cir. 1991), the court held that a hospital that
was a local governmental entity had immunity in a staff privileges action, based on Town
of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34 (1985). In Miller v. Indiana Hospital, 930
F.2d 334 (3d Cir. 1991), on the other hand, there was an insufficient showing of active
state supervision to warrant immunity under Parker v. Brown, 371 U.S. 341 (1943).
In Lancaster Community Hospital v. Antelope Valley Hospital District, 940 F.2d 397
(9th Cir. 1991), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's dismissal
on state action and LGAA grounds, focusing on two points. First, "the state has given
the defendants no power to regulate the hospital services market, but has merely author-
ized them to provide hospital services along with regular competitors." Id. at 402. Sec-
ond, there were numerous other actions of the California legislature that indicated that
the California state policy was not to displace competition with regulation - the test
under Town of Hallie. "We now hold that when there are abundant indications that a
state's policy is to support competition, a subordinate state entity must do more than
merely produce an authorization to 'do business' to show that the state's policy is to
displace competition." 940 F.2d at 403.
In Cohn v. Bond, 953 F.2d 154, 157-58 (4th Cir. 1991), the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that members of the medical staff had LGAA immunity because they acted
on behalf of the hospital.
Oksanen [v. Page Memorial Hospital, 945 F.2d 696 (4th Cir. 1991)] holds that
when members of the medical staff recommend action on an application for
3
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Coffey v. Healthtrust, Inc.9 presents an unusual twist on an
otherwise ordinary case involving an exclusive contract for hospi-
tal-based physician services. Dr. Coffey's group of radiologists was
the exclusive provider of radiology services at Edmond Memorial
Hospital. In the spring of 1988, the group began expanding the
services offered at its outpatient clinic to include computed
tomagraphy, mammography, and ultrasound, all of which had pre-
viously only been available as inpatient services at the hospital.
The hospital, concerned that "its" radiologists were taking pa-
tients away from the hospital's inpatient radiology services, termi-
nated its exclusive arrangement with Dr. Coffey's group and
entered into an exclusive contract with another radiologist, Dr.
Killebrew. Dr. Coffey and his group retained their staff privileges
at the hospital, but as a practical matter they no longer practiced
there. Dr. Coffey claimed that the hospital and various members
of its medical staff had engaged in a group boycott.
The court rejected the claim that there was a per se boycott on
the ground that the hospital and the medical staff were not hori-
zontal competitors.
We find as a matter of law that the relationship among the physi-
cians is insufficient to establish a per se group boycott. Any rela-
tionship which existed between the physicians [on the medical
staff] and [the hospital] and Dr. Killebrew and [the hospital] is
vertical. 'o
privileges, as authorized by the municipal hospital, they are acting in their ca-
pacity as employees, as opposed to private parties. Physicians who make peer
review decisions at the behest of, or by delegation from, the hospital's board of
trustees, are acting as agents of the hospital and are, therefore, indistinguishable
from the hospital. . . . Therefore, their actions in this respect are entitled to
immunity from money damages under the LGAA because of their unitary sta-
tus with Wilkes Hospital.
Recognizing that the LGAA determination disposed of the claim for damages, but not
for injunctive relief, the Cohn court continued with the Parker v. Brown analysis and
concluded that because the members of the medical staff acted as agents of the hospital,
the active supervision prong of Parker was inapplicable. "A municipal hospital decision
to deny privileges, therefore, meets the first prong of the Parker test. The actions of the
staff are immune when, as is true here, they are acting as agents of Wilkes Hospital, a
municipal hospital, in making their recommendation." Cohn, 953 F.2d at 158-59. In so
doing, the court rejected Dr. Cohn's claim that the medical staff exercised undue influ-
ence over the hospital board's decisions, stating that "since the medical staff and Wilkes
Hospital, in these circumstances, are the same entity, undue influence is irrelevant." Id.
at 159.
9. 955 F.2d 1388 (10th Cir. 1992).
10. Id. at 1392; see also Bloom v. Hennepin County, 783 F. Supp. 418 (D. Minn.
1992) (stating that nephrologists provide physician services and hence do not compete
with a kidney dialysis center that only provided the "technical component" of kidney
dialysis).
[Vol. I
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The court also rejected the claim that the alleged boycott vio-
lated the rule of reason because (1) Dr. Coffey failed to define a
relevant geographic market and (2) "what occurred ... was only a
reshuffling of competitors [that] had no detrimental effect on com-
petition"II because there was a single, exclusive provider of radiol-
ogy at the hospital both before and after the change; only the
identity of the exclusive contractor was different.' 2
These cases raise some very interesting problems. It certainly
appears that in both the hospitals were competitively threatened by
the plaintiffs' outpatient facilities (notwithstanding the Coffey
court's statement that physicians and hospitals do not compete).
Does a hospital have the right to restrict the privileges of a physi-
cian just because that physician proposes to compete with it? Or,
viewed from the other side, is a hospital required to allow open
access to its facilities, even by those who turn around and compete
with it?
Under traditional Sherman section 2 principles, a firm has no
general duty to cooperate with its competitors, 3 which is essen-
tially what the plaintiffs were seeking in both Coffey and Tarabishi.
But those same traditional Sherman section 2 principles seem to
suggest that, at a minimum, a firm with market power must have a
11. 955 F.2d at 1393.
12. Several other cases involving exclusive arrangements were decided during the
past year. The court in Morgan, Strand, Wheeler & Biggs v. Radiology, Ltd., 924 F.2d
1484 (9th Cir. 1991), affirmed a summary judgment dismissing Sherman section 1 claims
because the plaintiff failed to define a relevant market. The court in Shafi v. St. Francis
Hospital of Charleston, West Virginia, 937 F.2d 603 (4th Cir. 1991) (reported in full at
1991-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,500 (July 16, 1991)), found that an exclusive anesthesia
contract was permissible because the market share of 11% was too small to establish a
tying violation, but remanded the case to the district court to determine whether the
plaintiff had sufficiently alleged a relevant market to permit a boycott claim to go for-
ward. Anesthesia Advantage, Inc. v. Metz Group, 759 F. Supp. 638 (D. Colo. 1991),
involved a contest between certified registered nurse anesthetists ("CRNAs") and physi-
cian anesthesiologists ("MDAs"). The district court granted defendants' motion for
summary judgment essentially because the plaintiffs did not present sufficient evidence of
a conspiracy to rebut the defendants' showing of legitimate independent bases for their
actions. Bhan v. NME Hospitals, Inc., 929 F.2d 1404 (9th Cir. 1991), also involved
competition between MDAs and a CRNA who claimed that he had been unlawfully
excluded from providing anesthesia services at a small community hospital. The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the exclusive arrangement was neither an illegal
tying arrangement because the hospital did not have market power nor an illegal boycott
(under a rule of reason analysis) because Bhan did not "delineate a relevant market and
show that the defendant plays enough of a role in that market to impair competition
significantly." Id. at 1413.
13. "[E]ven a firm with monopoly power has no duty to engage in a joint marketing
program with a competitor." Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472
U.S. 585, 600 (1985).
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legitimate business justification for its refusal to cooperate.4
Similarly, if the hospitals had acted pursuant to a conspiracy,
and if the plaintiffs could have proven an effect on competition in a
relevant market, could the plaintiffs have prevailed on a rule of
reason claim? In each case, the plaintiffs could have argued that
the hospitals conspired to restrict access to the hospitals, and that
the purpose and effect of those restrictions was to restrain competi-
tion from the plaintiffs' respective outpatient facilities. Once again,
under traditional antitrust principles the rule of reason would re-
quire the hospitals to offer some procompetitive, efficiency, or
other justifications for their actions.' 5
From an antitrust counseling perspective, the point to recognize
is that the Coffey holding was based upon the defendant's lack of
market power. Defendants will not always be able to defeat anti-
trust claims based on the failure to define a relevant market. A
prudent provider that has market power should be prepared to of-
fer legitimate justifications for its conduct. 16
II. COMPETITION BETWEEN ALTERNATIVE DELIVERY
SYSTEMS
Unlike Tarabishi and Coffey, which arguably involved competi-
tion between providers at different levels, U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v.
Healthsource, Inc. '7 involved two managed care plans that clearly
were horizontal competitors. The plaintiff challenged attempts by
the defendant to discourage "its" primary care physicians
("PCPs") from participating in the plaintiff's competing plan. The
14. Id. at 605-11 (upholding a jury instruction that a monopolist's refusal to deal
with a competitor "does not violate section 2 if valid business reasons exist for that re-
fusal"); Olympia Equip. Leasing v. Western Union Tel., 797 F.2d 370, 376 (7th Cir.
1986) ("The monopoly supplier who retaliates against customers who have the temerity
to compete with him . . . is severing a collateral relationship in order to discourage
competition.").
15. "Absent some countervailing procompetitive virtue-such as, for example, the
creation of efficiencies in the operation of a market or the provision of goods and services,
... such an agreement limiting consumer choice by impeding the 'ordinary give and take
of the market place,' . . . cannot be sustained ... under the Rule of Reason." FTC v.
Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459 (1986) (citations omitted) (quoting National
Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978)).
16. See, e.g., Todorov v. DCH Healthcare Auth., 921 F.2d 1438, 1457, (11th Cir.
1991) (a hospital's desire to "preserve the efficient operation of the hospital's radiology
department" was a procompetitive explanation for its decision to deny privileges to an-
other applicant); Oksanen v. Page Memorial Hosp., 945 F.2d 696, 710, (4th Cir. 1991)
(removing a disruptive physician was a legitimate business justification because, the court
observed, "Page Memorial [Hospital] certainly had valid business and patient care rea-
sons for removing Oksanen before he irremediably poisoned the hospital environment.").
17. 1992-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,697 (D.N.H. Jan. 30, 1992), appeal pending.
[Vol. I
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defendant's contracts with PCPs provided that the PCP would re-
ceive a higher capitation payment if that PCP agreed not to deal
with any other health maintenance organization ("HMO") plan.
Each PCP was free either to accept or reject this exclusive provi-
sion (and to terminate it on thirty days' notice), but if the PCP
agreed to the exclusive, he or she would receive an average increase
in monthly capitation of approximately 14%.
Eighty-seven percent of the plan's PCPs agreed to the exclusive
arrangement. The defendant had 47,000 subscribers, about 5% of
the state's population. The plaintiff argued that there was little or
no business justification for the exclusive arrangement, rather it
was only imposed in order to block the plaintiff's entry into the
market and it had prevented the plaintiff from competing effec-
tively because it created a Catch 22: the plaintiff did not have
enough subscribers to induce the defendant's PCPs to give up their
exclusive arrangements, and it could not get enough subscribers
because it could not sign up enough PCPs.
The magistrate judge 8 concluded that there was not a sufficient
effect on competition to violate the antitrust laws. First, the exclu-
sive arrangement was not a per se violation because each PCP
could opt out on thirty days' notice and because the exclusive pro-
vision allowed the PCPs to participate in indemnity plans; it only
restricted participation in other HMOs. Second, the court rejected
the plaintiff's argument that the relevant market was the independ-
ent practice association ("IPA") HMO's in southern New Hamp-
shire, reasoning that the geographic market was all of New
Hampshire (because each plan had attempted to recruit providers
and obtain subscribers throughout the state) and that the product
market was all healthcare financing, not just IPA HMO plans (be-
cause "[tihe various health care financing plans are reasonably in-
terchangeable in that they sell health care financing to employers
or individuals.") 9 Third, there was no Sherman section 1 violation
because there was no injury to competition: "I find that . . . com-
petition has not been lessened. While the exclusive clause has
placed a restriction on PCP's [sic] participation with other HMOs,
I find on balance that the restriction does not constitute an unrea-
sonable restraint of trade under Section 1 of the Sherman Act."'2°
18. The parties consented to trial by the magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 636(c) (West Supp. 1992).
19. 1992-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,697, at 67,181.
20. Id. (citation omitted).
1992]
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Finally, there was no Sherman section 2 violation because the de-
fendant's five percent share of the market was too small.
The plaintiff's most persuasive argument was its claim that the
defendant's proffered justifications for the exclusivity arrangement
were weak and appeared to have been contrived after the fact. Es-
sentially, the plaintiff argued that the exclusive arrangement (1)
harmed the plaintiff, (2) lacked a legitimate business justification
and/or had less restrictive alternatives, and therefore (3) was a vio-
lation without the necessity of proving that the defendant had mar-
ket power. The magistrate judge was not prepared to accept this
argument (at least where the market shares were so low that it was
difficult to see what effect on competition the exclusive arrange-
ment had except to make it more difficult for the plaintiff to enter
the market), but the arguments may have had more appeal in a
market that is less competitive; antitrust counselors should advise
their clients accordingly. 2'
III. ALLIANCES WITH OTHER PROVIDERS AS COMPETITIVE
STRATEGIES
A. Price Fixing
A few providers appear to believe that the best strategy in a
competitive environment is to join their competitors. Those that
did not learn from the Maricopa decision22 or the numerous
speeches by officials of the Department of Justice and Federal
Trade Commission ("FTC") that this is often a per se violation
should be reminded of that fact by this year's enforcement
activities.
The FTC's consent decree in Southbank IPA, Inc. 23 is directed
primarily at joint negotiations and joint refusals to deal by the phy-
sician members of an IPA. The FTC claimed that the physicians
constituted nearly the entire OB/GYN medical staff of a hospital
and that they used their IPA as a vehicle for agreeing whether and
on what terms they would treat subscribers of various healthcare
21. See generally Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Ex-
clusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986).
22. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982); see also United
States v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 116 (1975) ("The central message of the
Sherman Act is that a business entity must find new customers and higher profits through
internal expansion-that is, by competing successfully rather than by arranging treaties
with its competitors.").
23. 56 Fed. Reg. 50,912 (Oct. 9, 1991), accepted by Federal Trade Commission, 57
Fed. Reg. 2,913 (Jan. 24, 1992).
[Vol. I
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plans and for agreeing to resist various plans' efforts to obtain re-
duced fees and/or cost containment measures. In United States v.
Burgstiner,24 similar in many respects, OB/GYNs allegedly met to
discuss fees under the auspices of the medical society, exchanged
information regarding current and prospective fees, and agreed on
the fees they would quote to a group of payors.
The important point about the results of these enforcement ac-
tivities is not what they prohibit (it is not news that price fixing is
illegal) but what they permit. First, they permit physicians to
"provid[e] information or views, individually or collectively with
other physicians, to any third-party payor concerning any issue,
including reimbursement. ' 26 Second, they permit providers to join
together in an "integrated joint venture, ' 27 at least
as long as the physician participants are free to deal individually
with any third-party payor that declines to deal with the inte-
grated joint venture, and the third-party payor is on notice that
the physicians remain free to deal individually with the third-
party payor at any time that it declines to deal with the inte-
grated joint venture.28
Thus, providers are free to "lobby" payors and to form joint ven-
tures that are less integrated than a merger so long as the risk
sharing and other requirements of In re Preferred Physicians, Inc. 29
are satisfied.
B. Hospital Mergers
FTC v. University Health, Inc. 30 is this year's hospital merger
decision, and it is noteworthy primarily because it is basically just a
merger case that happens to involve hospitals; the Clayton section
7 issues were not treated substantially differently just because hos-
24. 1991-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,422 (S.D. Ga. April 29, 1991) (consent decree).
25. See also United States v. Alston, 1991-1 Trade Cases (CCH) 69,366 (D. Ariz.
Dec. 17, 1990), the celebrated criminal case involving dentists in Tucson who sent a joint
letter to payors regarding the minimum co-payments that they would accept. The jury
convicted the defendants, the judge granted the motion for acquittal for two defendants
and for a new trial for a third, and the Government's appeal is pending.
26. Southbank IPA, Inc., 56 Fed. Reg. at 50,914.
27. The court in In re Preferred Physicians, Inc., 110 F.T.C. 157 (1988), defined an
integrated joint venture as "a joint arrangement to provide prepaid health care services in
which physicians who would otherwise be competitors pool their capital to finance the
venture, by themselves or together with others, and share substantial risk of adverse fi-
nancial results caused by unexpectedly high utilization or costs of health care services."
28. Southbank IPA, Inc., 56 Fed. Reg. at 50,916.
29. 110 F.T.C. 157.
30. 1991-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) $ 69,400 (S.D. Ga. April 11, 1991), remanded, 938
F.2d 1206 (1lth Cir. 1991).
1992]
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pitals were combining. The FTC sought to enjoin the acquisition
of the assets of St. Joseph Hospital by one of its competitors. The
district court denied the preliminary injunction, holding that (1)
there was not substantial competition between the two hospitals
because St. Joseph did not offer some of the services that were nec-
essary to compete for managed care and preferred provider con-
tracts; (2) the relevant market was acute inpatient services, but the
primary competition was in the area of outpatient services; (3)
there still would be three very strong hospitals in the community;
(4) without the acquisition, St. Joseph would inevitably wither and
die, even though it was fiscally sound at the time; and (5) a prelimi-
nary injunction would cause uncertainty and stress in the
community.31
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals remanded. First, the
court agreed with the Seventh Circuit 32 and disagreed with the
Fourth Circuit 33 that section 7 of the Clayton Act applies to asset
acquisitions by nonprofit hospitals. Then, relying on traditional
Clayton section 7 principles,34 the court had no trouble concluding
that the combined hospitals' market share of 43% would result in
"a firm controlling an undue percentage share of the relevant
market. 35
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that
the hospital failed to prove some of its defenses, and that its non-
profit status was not a defense even in theory. The defendant
claimed that although the acquired hospital was not a failing firm,
it was a weak competitor and this undermined the government's
statistical case. The court agreed that a defendant may rebut the
government's prima facie case by showing that the government's
market share statistics overstate the acquired firm's ability to
compete in the future and that, discounting the acquired firm's
market share to take this into account, the merger would not sub-
stantially lessen competition. The weakness of the acquired firm
is only relevant if the defendant demonstrates that this weakness
undermines the predictive value of the government's market
share statistics.36
However, the court concluded that the defendant had failed to
31. Id. at 65,614 to 65,615.
32. United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp., 898 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir. 1990).
33. United States v. Carilion Health Sys., 892 F.2d 1042 (4th Cir. 1989).
34. See, e.g., United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
35. Id. at 363. The showing of market concentration was bolstered, the court held,
by Georgia's certificate of need laws, which constituted an entry barrier.
36. 938 F.2d at 1221 (citations omitted).
[Vol. I
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make this showing, based largely on the fact that the acquired hos-
pital "is fiscally sound at the present time," and the fact that the
defendant "did not analyze St. Joseph's ability to adjust to chang-
ing market conditions nor did they explain why [it]... would not
remain competitive... in the future. ' 37 The court also recognized
the possibility of an efficiencies defense38 but concluded that the
defendant's showing was insufficient. To support an efficiencies de-
fense, the defendant "must demonstrate that the intended acquisi-
tion would result in significant economies and that these economies
ultimately would benefit competition and, hence, consumers. ' ' 9
In a footnote, the Eleventh Circuit also disposed of the hospital's
contention that the acquisition was immune under Parker v.
Brown I and its contention that because buyers of hospital care
typically are large and sophisticated insurance companies, there
was little likelihood of injury to competition. As to the first, the
court concluded that Georgia's certificate of need ("CON") re-
quirement did not demonstrate a clearly articulated state policy to
displace competition, in part because most acquisitions by existing
hospitals were exempt from the CON requirement. As to the "so-
phisticated buyer" defense, the court agreed that having large buy-
ers on one side of a market inhibits collusion. However, the court
concluded that the insurers did not really have leverage over the
hospitals because
as a practical matter [they] could not refuse to reimburse their
subscribers because the prices in the relevant market were too
high; rather, they would, as always, reimburse their subscribers
for necessary medical services and, if the price remained high,
they would pass these increased costs on to the individual
consumers.41
For those contemplating hospital mergers, the FTC v. University
Health, Inc. decision means that if an acquisition does not pass
muster under the traditional market share tests of United States v.
Philadelphia National Bank 42 and its progeny, the defendants must
be prepared to make a compelling factual showing that other fac-
tors make market shares insufficiently probative of future market
power or that the acquisition will generate substantial efficiencies
37. Id.
38. "We conclude that in certain circumstances, a defendant may rebut the govern-
ment's prima facie case with evidence showing that the intended merger would create
significant efficiencies in the relevant market." Id. at 1222.
39. Id. at 1223.
40. 371 U.S. 341 (1943).
41. 938 F.2d at 1213 n.13.
42. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
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that will be passed on to consumers.4 3 The interesting question
will be how the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals treats the issue of
efficiencies, if the Ukiah case" ever reaches the court of appeals.
There is significant Ninth Circuit law that efficiencies are not a de-
fense in a merger case.45 It will be interesting to see if the Ninth
Circuit follows those precedents or whether it follows the Eleventh
Circuit's ruling that such efficiencies could, at least theoretically,
provide a defense.
C. Vertical Integration
M & M Medical Supplies & Service v. Pleasant Valley Hospital,46
like Advanced Health-Care Services, Inc. v. Radford Community
Hospital 4 and Key Enterprises of Delaware, Inc. v. Venice Hospi-
tal,48 illustrates attempts to compete by vertically integrating into
related healthcare fields. In these cases, hospitals expanded into
the durable medical equipment ("DME") business and "steered"
their patients to their affiliates supplying DME. In M & M Medi-
cal Supplies, the hospital placed orders for DME with its subsidi-
ary as a part of the discharge process "without the patient being
allowed the opportunity to choose among competitors."49 The
plaintiff claimed that this constituted monopolization and at-
tempted monopolization. The district court granted summary
judgment for the defendants on the ground that the affidavit of the
plaintiff's expert was too conclusory to create a genuine issue of
material fact as to the relevant market. The Fourth Circuit con-
cluded that, based on the limited discovery that had been con-
ducted, the affidavit was sufficient to create a factual dispute so as
43. At least the first of these is in fact part of the Philadelphia National Bank test,
under which an acquisition is unlawful if it "produces a firm controlling an undue per-
centage share of the relevant market, and results in a significant increase in the concentra-
tion of firms in that market.., in the absence of evidence clearly showing that the merger
is not likely to have such anticompetitive effects." Id. at 363.
44. In re Adventist Health Sys./W. & Ukiah Adventist Hosp., No. 9234 (F.T.C.
Aug. 2, 1990).
45. See RSR Corp. v. F.T.C., 602 F.2d 1317, 1325 (9th Cir. 1979); California v.
American Stores Co., 697 F. Supp. 1125, 1133 (C.D. Cal. 1988), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part on other grounds, 872 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 495 U.S. 271
(1990).
46. 1991-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,618 (4th Cir. Oct. 22, 1991).
47. 910 F.2d 139 (4th Cir. 1990) (a steering arrangement might violate Sherman sec-
tion 2).
48. 919 F.2d 1550 (1 1th Cir. 1990) (a steering arrangement that was not supported by
efficiency justification violated Sherman sections 1 and 2).
49. 1991-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,618, at 66,761.
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to preclude summary judgment.5 0
Because of the procedural posture of the case at the Fourth Cir-
cuit, M & M Medical Supplies by itself is not a terribly important
case. However, the court's suggestion that "the linking of DME to
hospital services constitutes anticompetitive activity which may
support an inference of intent to monopolize," 5' coupled with the
Eleventh and Fourth Circuits' decisions in Key Enterprises and Ad-
vanced Health-Care, should lead antitrust advisors to counsel hos-
pitals against steering practices that deprive patients of free choice,
absent strong and legitimate business justifications for the
practices.
Abram v. Roxborough Memorial Hospital 2 is primarily a typical
staff privileges case. 53 The more interesting feature of the case is
that the plaintiff also claimed that the hospital was trying to ex-
pand into and monopolize the OB/GYN market by buying up
physician practices and requiring the purchased practices to use
the hospital exclusively. The plaintiff did not appear to present
enough specific factual evidence for the court to analyze this claim
in any detail, but the court did rule that there was nothing wrong
with the hospital buying physician practices and then requiring the
physicians to admit to, and practice at, the hospital. "[lit is per-
missible for a hospital to enter into practice contracts with practi-
tioners and to include exclusive dealing clauses in them .... As a
practical matter, doctors and hospitals do not compete with one
another for patients. Rather, they work together to provide pa-
50. Id. at 66,763.
51. Id. at 66,764.
52. 1991-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,528 (E.D. Pa. June 13, 1991), dismissed without
opinion, 952 F.2d 1391 (3d Cir. 1991).
53. The plaintiff claimed that a hospital and its OB/GYN staff members conspired to
exclude the plaintiff because the plaintiff could administer epidurals and other OB/GYNs
could not. The court dismissed the Sherman section 1 claims on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion,
holding that the plaintiff had failed to allege facts indicating an economic incentive for
the conspiracy. In another staff privileges case, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of
Appeals remanded the district court's decision dismissing a claim on the ground that the
hospital had not made a final decision revoking the plaintiff's privileges. Johnson v.
Greater S.E. Community Hosp. Corp., 951 F.2d 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (directing the
district court to conduct additional fact-finding to determine if the privileges were in fact
terminated). In addition, the D.C. Circuit stated that an alleged conspiracy to exclude
the plaintiff from participating in a preferred provider organization that had contracted
to provide care to an HMO's enrolles was at least arguably an antitrust violation. In
Oksanen v. Page Memorial Hosp., 945 F.2d 696 (4th Cir. 1991), the Fourth Circuit held
that a hospital and its medical staff were legally incapable of conspiring, at least where
the medical staff's privileges recommendation was made at the request of the hospital's
administration.
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tients with needed services." 4 Moreover, the court ruled, the
plaintiff could not have an essential facilities claim because the hos-
pital had not denied the plaintiff access to the hospital. The plain-
tiff still had staff privileges, although they had been restricted.
IV. CONCLUSION
The cases of the early 1990's suggest that plaintiffs should not
rely on per se rules; they must be prepared to define and prove a
relevant market and the adverse effects on competition within that
market. Conversely, defendants must remember that the "applica-
tion of the rule of reason does not necessarily mean the practice is
permissible under the antitrust laws"55 and must have and prove
legitimate business justifications for their conduct. Thus, this
year's cases reinforce the court's willingness to engage in factual
analysis when the alleged anticompetitive activity involves the
healthcare industry.
54. 1991-2 Trade Cas. 69,528, at 66,332. This practice may also present interesting
issues under the Medicare Fraud and Abuse laws.
55. Reynolds v. California Dental Serv., 246 Cal. Rpt. 331 (1988).
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